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NOTES

Widow's Election - Amortizable Cost in the
Purchase of a Life Estate
In community-property states many wills provide that a widow, in lieu
of taking her one-half share in the community property, may receive the
income for life from a trust consisting of the entire community estate.
Under section 167 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541 widows
have sought to amortize the cost of this exchange, claiming that it is a
bargained-for sale and purchase.! The Commissioner, however, relying on
section 273 of the Code a has refused to allow any deduction for amortization. His position is that the widow, having acquired her life estate by
bequest from her husband's testamentary disposition of his property, has
paid nothing for the income rights and has no cost or capital investment
to recoup via amortization. 4 He has also pointed out that gift tax returns
have been filed in connection with the transfer of the widow's remainder
interest to the trust, indicating a gift of the widow's property rather than
a sale or purchase.' The Commissioner, however, has only one case in support of this proposition.' The Tax Court7 and Ninth Circuit0 have recently
upheld the widow's right to amortize the cost of the purchase. However,
the amortizable cost has been limited to the actuarially computed value
of the life estate in the deceased spouse's community property.
I. WIDow's ELECTION-A PURCHASE

A gift tax case, Commissioner v. Siegal,' has been cited often and generally followed in support of the proposition that the exchange of interests is a purchase for gift tax purposes.' In Siegal the Commissioner contended that the widow received no consideration for making the election,
' This section allows as a "depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion ...
of property held for the production of income." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 167(a) (2).
'See, e.g., Gist v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 1118
(9th Cir. 1970); Estate of Christ, 54 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
54.46 (1970).
'INT. REv. CODE of 1954, S 273, provides that "[a]mounts paid . . . as income to the holder
of a life or terminable interest acquired by gift, bequest, or inheritance shall not be reduced or
diminished by any deduction for shrinkage (by whatever name called) in the value of such interest
4 due to the lapse of time."
See Gist v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 1118 (9th
Cir. 1970); Estate of Christ, 54 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 5 54.46 (1970).
' Estate of Christ, 54 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 5 54.46, at 377 (1970).
0Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U.S. 365 (1933). While the primary question in Butterwort
was whether the trustee was allowed a deduction for income distributed to the widow, there was
dictum to the effect that the widow, by accepting the provisions of her husband's will in lieu of
her statutory rights, was not a purchaser of the income for life, but occupied the position of beneficiary of the trust. The Supreme Court carried this further by stating: "When she makes her
election the widow decides to accept the benefits of the will with the accompanying rights and
liabilities. In no proper sense does she purchase an annuity." Id. at 370. The impact of this case
is lessened, however, by the fact that it did not arise in a community-property jurisdiction. Butterworth arose in Pennsylvania, where the widow's statutory interests in the husband's estate arise
only after his death. The holding was ultimately limited to the narrow issue of whether the widow
was a beneficiary under the terms of the applicable statute.
7 Estate of Christ, 54 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 5 54.46 (1970).
a Gist v. United States, 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1970).
9250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1957).
1 See, e.g., Estate of Vardell v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962); Gist v. United
States, 296 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1970); Estate of Christ,
54 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 5 54.46, at 378 (1970).
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and that the entire value of her community-property rights was a gift to
the estate. By implication, this means that her acquisition of the life estate
in all the community property was by bequest or inheritance rather than
by purchase. The Ninth Circuit rejected this contention, stating that
elections to take under a will by one of the spouses instead of property
that he or she may be entitled to under state law have long been recognized as transactions in which the property surrendered is considered the
consideration for the offer made in the will." In all instances the effect
of the election is determined by the law of the state." Since under California law the interests of husband and wife in community property are
declared to be "present, existing, and equal,"'" the court in Siegal ruled
the widow had a vested interest in one half of the community property
even before her husband's death. Thus, the value of the remainder interest
surrendered was consideration for a life estate in the husband's community
one-half which was received under the will.
For purposes of federal estate and gift taxes, it appears that the exercise of a widow's election where the estate consists entirely of community
property is considered to be a bargained-for sale or exchange made for
consideration, even though the value of the remainder interest given up
has generally greatly exceeded the value of the life estate received and a gift
tax, in most instances, has been paid on this excess." The husband's life
estate is viewed as "consideration in money or money's worth" which reduces the taxable amount of the wife's disposition of her interests for gift
and estate tax purposes.' The term "consideration in money or money's
worth" appears in sections 2036 (a)" and 2043 (a)"1 (estate tax) and section 2512(b)"9 (gift tax) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Its
purpose is to give a credit for the amount received against a taxable gift
or transfer.
While the existence of such "consideration" for gift and estate tax pur-

poses does not require a holding that there has been a sale or exchange
for income tax purposes, it appears the Tax Court 9 and Ninth Circuit'
have extended this reasoning into the income tax field. The Tax Court
reasoned that an exchange of interests is carried out primarily for the
widow's own economic self-interest, and, therefore, considered it a bargained-for sale or purchase. The widow's election to transfer her share

of the community property to the trust and to accept the benefits of the
trust did not result from "charitable impulses or from a detached and
disinterested generosity."'" It involved concern for her own economic well" 250 F.2d at 340-41.
"Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
13CAL. CIv. CODE § 161a (West 1954).
4

See, e.g., Estate of Vardell v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962); Commissioner
v. Siegal, 250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1957).

is id.

REV. CODE Of 1954, S 2036(a).
17Id. § 2043 (a).
'8Id. § 2512(b).
"Estate of Christ, 54 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 5 54.46 (1970).
" Gist v. United States, 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1970).
1 54 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 378.
'6INT.
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being, which is the incentive for choosing to receive the income from the
entire community. In response to the Commissioner's contention that gift
tax paid by the widow is indicative of a donative intent and, therefore,
constitutes a gift rather than a purchase, the Tax Court stated that it has
long been recognized that donative intent is not a necessary element to
subject a transfer to gift tax.'
The Ninth Circuit," having adopted the district court's reasoning, felt
simply that it was illogical in light of Siegal and Estate of Vardell v. ComM to conclude
missioner"
that the widow's election was not a purchase. It
believed that the creation of the life estate upon the exercise of the widow's
election did not alter the fact that the widow may be a purchaser for
value, as would one to whom she sold her life estate for cash.
II.

AMORTIZATION

If the widow's election is considered to be a bargained-for sale or exchange, the question then arises whether the purchaser is entitled to amor-

tization deductions based on the cost of acquiring the life interest in the
deceased's portion of the community property transferred to the trust.
The right to amortize in situations where an interest in an estate has been
purchased appears to be unquestioned." In the leading case, Bell v.Harrison,- the taxpayer, who owned the remainder interest in a trust, pur-

chased the life estate. The taxpayer contended that this was a capital
expenditure wasting in value with time and that he should be entitled to
recover his cost basis. The Government, however, took the position that
the purchase of the life interest resulted in a "merger" of the two estates,
and that for tax purposes, there was no life estate to amortize after the

merger. Under this view the capital invested could only be recouped at
the time of sale or other disposition. The Seventh Circuit, in deciding for
the taxpayer, stated, " 'What he purchased ... was a terminable estate and
the termination of the estate will end all that he purchased.' "" In a similar situation, the Tax Court compared the problem to that of a purchaser
of a lease, stating: "Nor can we perceive any difference in this respect
between the purchase of a lease of a life interest and the purchase of the
life interest itself. In both cases the interest is terminable and exhaustible
for income tax-purposes." The Internal Revenue Service acquiesced to
amortization of the purchase price of a life estate after the decisions of
Commissioner v. Fry" and Bell." In its acquiescence, the Service noted that

"the transactions in these cases appear to be bona fide and without a tax
"See,

e.g., Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
"Gist v. United States, 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1970).
24307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962).
"See Rev. Rul. 62-132, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 73.
"'212 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1954).
" Id. at 254.
"Keitel v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 903, 907 (1929).
"9 283 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1960).
3' 212 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1954).
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avoidance motive. These cases will be followed in the disposition of other
cases in which the facts are substantially the same." '
Until recently the valuation of amortization cost in the purchase of a
life estate through the widow's election method has been untested in
court.' However, in Estate of Christ8s and Gist v. United States" this is
specifically defined. In Christ the widow claimed as the cost of the life
estate the difference between the value of the remainder interest surrendered and the life estate received, while in Gist the widow tried to use
the value of the entire life estate. The Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court
held that the cost should be limited to the value of the spouse's life estate
received by the widow. The amount by which the widow's remainder interest exceeds this value is considered a gift and is not used in computing
the cost. In Christ the Tax Court reasoned that the remainder value of the
widow's community interest should not be included in her cost, since at
her death the remaindermen would be entitled to it. The remainder interest would not be reduced or exhausted by the widow, because she has no
control over it under the terms of the election agreement. The district
court in Gist felt that the taxpayer was resorting to a legal fiction in assuming that she had sold all of her community-property interest in return
for a life interest in all the community property. The district court stated
that "[w]hile it is true that plaintiff could have purchased a commercial
annuity with her share of the community and amortized its cost over her
lifetime, this she did not do."' The taxpayer already owned the life estate
in her own community property and in no way could it be said she exchanged it and re-purchased it.'
III. CONCLUSION

A look into this area cannot be made without reference to the related
gift and estate tax problems that arise whenever this election method is
used." Briefly, in community-property states such as Texass and California, the widow's-election estate plan has become popular because of the
possible estate tax savings at the time of the widow's subsequent death.
A well-drafted widow's election may allow the wife's community-property
interest to pass at her death with a reduced estate tax or with no estate
tax, according to the facts in each case.' Such a will may also permit the
55

Id. at 254.
" Gist v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 1118

(9th Cit.

1970).
3354 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 54.46 (1970).
34423 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1970).
a296 F. Supp. at 529.
The value of the life estate and remaider interests are computed by the use of Table 1 of
Treas. Reg. S 20.2031-7(f) (1971). To compute the annual amortization deduction, the actuarial
value of the life estate transferred to the taxpayer is divided by the remaining life expectancy of
the taxpayer in terms of years.
" For a thorough discussion of estate and gift tax problems involving the widow's election, see
Comment, The Widow's Election-A Study in Three Parts, 15 Sw. L.J. 85, 144-6 (1961).
3s The effect in Texas of the widow's election on the community property will be the same as
in California, since each spouse has a vested interest in one half of the community property. Dakan
v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935).
" See Comment, supra note 37, at 156.
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life estate in the husband's community interest that passes to the wife to
escape the second estate tax at her death.
Generally, the widow's election results in a gift to the trust taxable to
her, but the value of the gift for tax purposes is only the value of the
property relinquished by the electing spouse, less the value of the consideration received (the value of the life estate in the husband's half of
the community property).' Since the values of the interests are determined
by actuarial tables, the age of the widow will determine the amount of
gift tax liability.4' When the widow is fairly young and the actuarial value
of the life estate is fifty per cent or more of the total value of her community one-half, no gift tax will result.'
Prior to Gist and Christ, there had been no income tax cases holding
that the widow could amortize the cost of her life estate in a widow's
election situation." Although the courts have limited the amortization
deduction to the value of the life estate in the deceased spouse's community property, up to this time it was not clear whether any deduction was
allowable at all. These decisions will aid the practitioner in determining
the possible worth or benefit of a widow's-election type of estate plan in
community-property states. Through the determination of possible trust
income to the widow, income tax liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy. The amortization deduction could be a substantial taxsaving tool in light of the fact that other deductions such as depreciation
or depletion may still be available to the widow through section 167(h)
of the Internal Revenue Code." The Gist and Christ decisions also emphasize the necessity of handling the widow's election agreement in the will
as a purchase and sale agreement rather than a transfer that could be
construed as a gift. This will insure the use of the amortization deduction,
the feature which makes the plan so attractive.
Robert L. Abbott

' For methods on how to avoid the gift tax problem, see id. at 150-51.
1
" d. at 150.
'Provision
should be made for payment of gift taxes by the trust, since in the normal case
the wife, after her election, has no assets from which the gift tax can be paid.
'Gist v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir.

1970).
1954, S 167(h) provides:
In the case of property held by one person for life with remainder to another person,
the deduction shall be computed as if the life tenant were the absolute owner of
the property and shall be allowed to the life tenant. In the case of property held in
trust, the allowable deduction shall be apportioned between the income beneficiaries
and the trustee in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the instrument creating the trust, or, in the absence of such provisions, on the basis of the trust income
allowable to each.

"4INT. REv. CODE of

